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Outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome in
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region: case report
Moira Chan-Yeung, W C Yu
Abstract
Objective To describe the outbreak of severe acute
respiratory syndrome in Hong Kong.
Design Descriptive case series.
Setting Hong Kong, Special Administrative Region,
China
Results The outbreak started with a visitor from
southern China on 21 February. At the hospitals
where the first cases were treated the disease spread
quickly among healthcare workers, and then out into
the community as family members became infected.
By 1 April, 685 cases had been reported with 16
deaths. Symptoms include high fever and one or
more respiratory symptoms (including cough,
shortness of breath, and difficulty breathing). Changes
in lung tissue suggest that part of the lung damage is
due to cytokines induced by the microbial agent,
which has led to empirical treatment with
corticosteroids, broad spectrum antiviral agent, and
antibacterial cover. There is strong evidence that a
novel coronavirus is the pathogen. Precautions for
droplet infection should be instituted, including the
wearing of masks and rigorous disinfection and
hygiene procedures. On 27 March the Department of
Health announced drastic measures, including
vigorous contact tracing and examination, quarantine
of contacts in their homes, and closure of all schools
and universities.
Conclusion The rapidity of the spread of the disease
and the morbidity indicate that the agent responsible
is highly infectious and virulent. Strict infection
control measures for droplet and contact transmission
by healthcare workers, a vigilant healthcare
profession, and public education are essential for
disease prevention.
Introduction
On 12 March 2003, the World Health Organization
issued a global alert on atypical pneumonia, called
severe acute respiratory syndrome, after reports from
the Department of Health of Hong Kong of an
outbreak of pneumonia in one of its public hospitals.
At about the same time, the WHO received reports of
the syndrome from China, Singapore, Vietnam,
Thailand, Indonesia, Taiwan, and Philippines, as well as
from countries in other continents including Canada,
the United States, and Germany. The disease
originated in Guangdong at the end of last year and
has affected over 300 people and killed five.1
We here describe the outbreak that occurred in
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
Case reports
History of the outbreak
The outbreak in Hong Kong started when a doctor
from southern China arrived on 21 February 2003 and
stayed in a local hotel. He had been unwell for a few
days before the trip but now became seriously ill and
died in a local hospital. However, he had infected his
brother-in-law, two nurses in the hospital, and seven
guests who had stayed on the same floor of the hotel.
One of these hotel guests was admitted into a major
public hospital on 24 February and was responsible for
the outbreak there affecting at least 88 healthcare
workers and 18 medical students. Another major
outbreak affecting 237 residents (at the time of writing)
in a housing estate was traced back to a patient
discharged from the same ward of the public hospital.
The table shows the number of affected healthcare
workers in the public hospital and other healthcare
facilities, cases in the community, and the total
cumulative number of daily reported cases.2 At the time
of writing, 685 cases had been reported with 16 deaths.
The disease, initially affecting mainly healthcare
workers, spread rapidly to the community as family
members became infected and in turn infected their
coworkers and friends.When symptoms developed, they
consulted their general practitioners, leading to more
healthcare workers developing the disease. It is now
known that three of the hotel guests were responsible for
the outbreaks in Hanoi, Singapore, and Toronto. There
were also smaller clusters arising from individuals
having travelled to southern China in the one to two
weeks between infection and onset of symptoms.
Cumulative number of cases of severe acute respiratory syndrome reported to the
Department of Health, Hong Kong, from 14 March to 1 April 2003
Date
Healthcare workers
Patients,
families, and
visitors Cumulative total
Hospital where
outbreak started
Other
healthcare
workers Total
14 March 3 0 3 0 3
15 March 36 0 36 0 36
16 March 36+13* 0 49 0 49
17 March 44+16* 12 72 23 95
18 March 47+17* 20 84 39 123
19 March 54+17* 21 92 58 150
20 March 58+17* 24 99 74 173
21 March 66+17* 27 110 93 203
22 March 68+17* 29 114 108 222
23 March 73+17* 32 122 125 247
24 March 78+17* 34 129 136 265
25 March 82+17* 35 134 156 290
26 March 88+18* 37 143 176 319
27 March NA NA 149 221 370
28 March NA NA 153 272 425
29 March NA NA 156 314 470
30 March NA NA 162 368 530
31 March NA NA 164 446 610
1 April NA NA 168 517 685
NA=Not assessed. *Medical students
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Laboratory and pathological findings
The local experience indicated that the incubation
period is between two and 11 days.3 All patients
presented with fever (temperature > 38°C), chills, and
myalgia. Pulmonary infiltrates appeared in chest radio-
graphs early, even before the start of dyspnoea. Symp-
toms of cough and sputum were not always present. A
few patients had diarrhoea. Lymphopenia was the
striking feature, with mild thrombocytopenia. Mild
liver dysfunction was noted in most cases.
All sputum, blood, and urine cultures were negative
for bacterial pathogens. Direct immunofluorescent
stains of nasopharyngeal aspirate failed to show the
presence of adenovirus; influenza A and B; parainflu-
enza 1, 2, and 3; and respiratory syncytial virus.
Serological examination at one and 14 days did not
show increases in titre of antibodies against myco-
plasma, chlamydia, or legionella. In some patients the
pneumonic infiltration was rapidly progressive, result-
ing in severe oxygen desaturation requiring assisted
ventilation.
A research team in the University of Hong Kong
isolated a virus belonging to the family Coronaviridae
from two patients.4 Using serological and reverse-
transcriptase polymerase chain reaction specific for
this virus, they found 45 out of 50 patients with severe
acute respiratory syndrome had evidence of infection
with this virus but not in the sera of 80 patients with
respiratory or other disease or 200 blood donors.
However, reverse-transcriptase polymerase chain reac-
tion is currently only used in research laboratories. At
present, the diagnosis of severe acute respiratory
syndrome remains a clinical one according to WHO
definition.1 Diagnostic features include high fever, one
or more respiratory symptoms (including cough,
shortness of breath, and difficulty breathing), and close
contact with a person who has been diagnosed with
severe acute respiratory syndrome.
The open lung biopsy of the patient who provided
samples for viral culture showed histological changes
typical of adult respiratory distress syndrome.3 There
was diffuse alveolar damage, hyaline membrane
formation, and minimal mononuclear cell infiltration.
Viral inclusion bodies were not found, although this
could have been due to sampling error. The changes in
lung tissue suggest that part of the lung damage is due
to cytokines induced by the microbial agent. This
hypothesis forms the basis of treatment with cortico-
steroids.
Treatment
The following empirical treatment has been suggested
by the Hospital Authority, Hong Kong,5 based initially
on the experience with a small number of cases and
subsequently confirmed by favourable results in a pro-
portion of patients:
x Broad spectrum antiviral agent—ribavirin 8 mg/kg
every 8 hours intravenously or 1.2 g every 12 hours
orally, with an oral loading dose of 4 g for those with
normal renal function test, for 7-14 days depending on
the response and the time of tailing off of
corticosteroids
x Hydrocortisone 2 mg/kg every six hours or 4 mg/kg
every 8 hours intravenously, tail off over one week when
there is clear clinical improvement. For severe and
rapidly deteriorating cases, methylprednisolone
10 mg/kg every 24 hours intravenously for two days,
and then continue with hydrocortisone as above
x Antibacterial coverage for typical and atypical
agents for 7-14 days using drugs such as levofloxacin
and macrolides.
Patients should be given antiulcer prophylaxis and
monitored for haemoglobin concentration, reticulo-
cyte count, and blood glucose and potassium
concentrations. The efficacy of this regimen requires
careful assessment.
Precautions
The most likely route of transmission is by droplets
and direct inoculation of secretions on to mucus mem-
brane. The serious outbreak in the public hospital
could have been due to the use of nebulised broncho-
dilator in the index patient, causing atomisation of
infected secretion.6 Procedures thought to increase the
risk of disease transmission include diagnostic sputum
induction, bronchoscopy, endotracheal intubation, and
airway suction.7
The precautions for droplet infection should be
instituted. Patients should wear N-95 masks once
symptoms develop and be placed immediately in isola-
tion facilities with negative pressure. Healthcare work-
ers should wear similar masks together with head
cover, goggles, gowns, and gloves when caring for these
patients. Daily and terminal disinfection should be
thorough, with careful washing and disinfection of the
bed, handrails, bedside tables, floor, and equipment
with hypochlorite solution (1000 ppm). For intubated
patients, the use of closed suction system is essential to
avoid air leak and enhanced disease transmission.
Healthcare workers should have a high index of
suspicion if they or family members develop fever and
features suggestive of severe acute respiratory syn-
drome. They should present themselves to hospitals
rather than treating themselves at home and putting
their family members at risk. For doctors in the
What is already known on this topic
Severe acute respiratory syndrome is a form of
atypical pneumonia that originated in southern
China and spread globally in a few weeks
The clinical picture, empirical treatment, and the
possible mode of disease transmission have been
described. The agent responsible is probably a
novel coronavirus
What this study adds
This report gives an account of the daily reported
number of cases in Hong Kong, showing how the
disease has spread rapidly from healthcare
workers to the community, and of the drastic
measures the government has finally introduced
to attempt to control the disease
A vigilant healthcare profession, strict infection
control measures, and public education are
essential to prevent disease dissemination
Early introduction of quarantine procedures for
this disease by health authorities should be
considered.
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community, it is advisable to wear a N-95 mask in when
seeing any patient with respiratory symptoms. Con-
tacts of proved cases should isolate themselves until the
incubation period is over. After contact with patients
with respiratory symptoms, careful hand hygiene is
necessary, with washing with soap and water.
On 27 March the Department of Health finally
announced drastic measures, including vigorous
contact tracing and examination, quarantine of
contacts in their homes, and closure of all schools and
universities. A major hospital has been designated for
infected patients. On 1 April all residents from the
building in the housing estate where the outbreak
occurred were evacuated to a holiday camp. Most pub-
lic gatherings have been postponed to later dates.
Conclusions
Severe acute respiratory syndrome is highly infectious
and potentially lethal. It caught the medical profession
in Hong Kong unaware. The drastic measures
introduced by the Hong Kong government, together
with intensive education of the public on personal
hygiene and the wearing of masks in public places, will,
we hope, halt this epidemic. Other health authorities
faced with this disease should consider early introduc-
tion of quarantine procedures.
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Delayed immunisation and risk of pertussis in infants:
unmatched case-control study
Cameron C Grant, Mavis Roberts, Robert Scragg, Joanna Stewart, Diana Lennon, Denise Kivell,
Rodney Ford, Rosalie Menzies
Pertussis remains a severe disease in infants. As about
two thirds of infants with pertussis are admitted to hos-
pital, factors that seem to be associated with an
increased risk of pertussis may in fact be associated
with an increased risk of hospital admission.1 2 The
admission rate for pertussis in New Zealand is five to
10 times higher than in England and Wales and the
United States.3 We determined whether immunisation
reduced the risk of admission to hospital for pertussis
by comparing infants admitted with pertussis and
infants admitted with other acute respiratory illnesses.
Participants, methods, and results
We performed an unmatched case-control study
during the 1995-7 pertussis epidemic in Auckland,
New Zealand. Pertussis was defined as cough lasting at
least two weeks, with coughing paroxysms, inspiratory
“whoop,” or vomiting after coughing. The control
group consisted of 98 infants admitted to hospital with
a coughing illness who were culture negative for Borde-
tella pertussis and had no B pertussis DNA detected in
their nasopharyngeal sample after amplification by
polymerase chain reaction. We interviewed each
infant’s care giver and determined written confirma-
tion of the infant’s immunisation status from his or her
health record book or the family doctor’s records.
In New Zealand, immunisations are scheduled at
age 6 weeks, 3 months, and 5 months. An
immunisation was delayed if it had not been received
within 30 days of its first being due.4 We used logistic
regression to calculate odds ratios and 95% confi-
dence intervals to determine the risk of pertussis asso-
ciated with delayed immunisation. We defined
socioeconomic status by the occupation of the house-
hold’s main income earner. We measured social dep-
rivation by using the 1996 New Zealand social
deprivation index.5
Odds ratios (95% confidence intervals) of catching pertussis associated with delays in giving pertussis vaccine
Delayed immunisation
No/total (%) of participating infants with delayed dose Adjustment for
Pertussis cases (n=97) Hospital controls (n=98) Age only Other variables*
First dose of DTPH† 13/70 (19) 10/71 (14) 2.13 (0.77 to 6.20) 2.23 (0.64 to 8.67)
Second dose of DTPH† 10/25 (40) 18/49 (37) 1.60 (0.53 to 4.94) 2.37 (0.59 to 10.40)
Third dose of DTPH† 9/13 (69) 9/26 (35) 4.25 (1.07 to 19.54) 6.09 (1.00 to 49.64)
Any immunisation 21/70 (30) 23/71 (33) 2.66 (1.02 to 7.71) 4.50 (1.22 to 20.94)
*Multivariate analyses included variables describing infants’ age, social deprivation, and crowding in households, and, in the analysis of delay for any immunisation,
maternal education.
†DTPH=Diphtheria-tetanus-pertussis-haemophilus type B whole cell vaccine (Tetramune; Wyeth Lederle, United States).
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